



# The ecology, epidemiology and zoonotic potential of MERS-CoV



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# One Health

335 EID events (1940-2004):  
60% are zoonotic origin

(Jones et al., Nature 2008)

## Examples:


### Animal coronavirus

- SARS
- MERS

### Animal influenza virus

- Pandemic H1N1
- H5N1
- H7N9


## The One Health Triad



# Outline


- Animal hosts / source of zoonotic infection
- MERS-CoV genetic and antigenic diversity
- Therapy/Vaccine?

# CONFIRMED GLOBAL CASES OF MERS-COV 2012 - 2016



# Epidemic Curve of MERS: Up to 09 October 2015

Reported to WHO as of 09 Oct 2015 (n=1595)



Other countries: Algeria, Austria, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Iran, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Netherlands, Oman, Philippines, Qatar, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Yemen

Please note that the underlying data is subject to change as the investigations around cases are ongoing. Onset date estimated if not available.

# Animal source of MERS-CoV?

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus neutralising serum antibodies in dromedary camels: a comparative serological study  
Lancet Infect Dis 2013

*Chantal BE M Reusken\*, Bart L Haagmans\*, Marcel A Müller\*, Carlos Gutierrez, Gert-Jan Godeke, Benjamin Meyer, Doreen Muth, V Stalin Raj, Laura Smits-De Vries, Victor M Corman, Jan-Felix Drexler, Saskia L Smits, Yasmin EEI Tahir, Rita De Sousa, Janko van Beek, Norbert Nowotny, Kees van Maanen, Ezequiel Hidalgo-Hermoso, Berend-Jan Bosch, Peter Rottier, Albert Osterhaus, Christian Gortázar-Schmidt, Christian Drosten, Marion P G Koopmans*

Eurosurveillance 2013

Seroepidemiology for MERS coronavirus using microneutralisation and pseudoparticle virus neutralisation assays reveal a high prevalence of antibody in dromedary camels in Egypt, June 2013

R A Perera<sup>1,2</sup>, P Wang<sup>2,3,4</sup>, M R Gomaa<sup>5</sup>, R El-Shesheny<sup>5</sup>, A Kandeil<sup>5</sup>, O Bagato<sup>5</sup>, L Y Siu<sup>3</sup>, M M Shehata<sup>5</sup>, A S Kayed<sup>5</sup>, Y Moatasim<sup>5</sup>, M Li<sup>3</sup>, L L Poon<sup>4</sup>, Y Guan<sup>4</sup>, R J Webby<sup>6</sup>, M A Ali<sup>5</sup>, J S Peiris (malik@hku.hk)<sup>3</sup>, G Kayali (ghazi.kayali@stjude.org)<sup>6</sup>

Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in dromedary camels: an outbreak investigation  
Lancet Infect Dis 2014

*Bart L Haagmans\*, Said H S Al Dhahiry\*, Chantal BE M Reusken\*, V Stalin Raj\*, Monica Galiano, Richard Myers, Gert-Jan God Elmoubasher Farag, Ayman Diab, Hazem Ghobashy, Farhoud Alhajri, Mohamed Al-Thani, Salih A Al-Marri, Hamad E Al Romc Abdullatif AlKhal, Alison Bermingham, Albert D M E Osterhaus, Mohd M AlHajri, Marion P G Koopmans*

Emerg Infect Dis 2014

**MERS Coronavirus  
in Dromedary  
Camel Herd,  
Saudi Arabia**

Evidence for Camel-to-Human  
Transmission of MERS Coronavirus

*Esam I. Azhar, Ph.D., Sherif A. El-Kafrawy, Ph.D., Suha A. Farraj, M.Sc., Ahmed M. Hassan, M.Sc., Muneera S. Al-Saeed, B.Sc., Anwar M. Hashem, Ph.D., and Tariq A. Madani, M.D.*


NEJM 2014

*Maged G. Hemida,<sup>1</sup> Daniel K.W. Chu,<sup>1</sup> Leo L.M. Poon, Ranawaka A.P.M. Perera, Mohammad A. Alhammadi, Hoi-ye Ng, Lewis Y. Siu, Yi Guan, Abdelmohsen Alnaeem, and Malik Peiris*

# Serological surveillance of MERS-CoV using pseudotyped virus in a **BSL2** facility


H5N1 (J Clin Virol, 2010)  
 MERS (Euro Surveill. 2013)  
 Ebola (Clin Chem, 2015)

## pseudotyped virus in a **BSL2** facility




Human sera from the MERS outbreak in Seoul

EID 2015



• A good correlation between MN and ppNT



• Good specificity

Control serum positive for:

CCoV      BCoV      TCoV  
 TGEV      SARS-CoV  
 PRCoV      MHV  
 FIPV

**All negative in the assay**

# Sero-prevalence studies in animals and humans (ppNT/MN)

		
Animal	KSA	Egypt
Camels	310 (90%)	110 (94%)
Camels (1993)	131 (96%)	
Goats 	144 (0%)	13 (0%)
Sheep 	199 (0%)	5 (0%)
Cattle 	101 (0%)	8 (0%)
Chicken	351 (0%)	
Human	350 (0%)	815 (0%)

Perera et al Eurosurveill 2013; Hemida et al Eurosurv 2013; Chu et al EID 2014;  
 Chan et al EID 2015; Miguel et al EID – submitted; Unpublished data

# MERS CoV:


● MERS-CoV active

● No MERS-CoV

## Geographic range and species



Chan et al EID 2015



**77% of global dromedary population**

Wherever seropositive camels are found, virus can be detected by RT-PCR (at much lower prevalence) **4%**


© 2009 www.outline-world-map.com

*Reusken et al EID 2014; Perera et al EID 2013; Hemida et al 2014; Chan et al 2015; Chu et al., Euro Surveill 2015; Unpublished data*



# How widespread of MERS-CoV in dromedary camels?

Summarized by Reusken et al. (EID 2014)




Camel sera sampled in Sudan in 1983 are seropositive for MERS-CoV (Muller et al., EID 2014)

Wherever seropositive camels are found, virus can be detected by RT-PCR (at much lower prevalence)

# Full genome sequence phylogenetic tree of MERS-CoV transmission within a camel herd over 1 month

*Hemida MG, et al Emerg Infect Dis. 2014 Jul;20(7):1231-4.*



November 30

December 30

Identical over 30,100 nt



Full genome sequence of Vero cell isolate differed from direct sequencing from clinical specimen in 3 nucleotides:  
*Synonymous: ORF1b;*  
*Non-synonymous:*  
*Spike (S1251F);*  
*Membrane (T8I) proteins*

# A dromedary herd with virus transmission for 1 month

Table 1. RT-PCR of dromedary camel samples for MERS-CoV, Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia\*

Farm, sampling date	Age†/no. sampled	No. specimens positive/no. tested		
		Nasal	Oral	Fecal
Farm A				
2013 Nov 30	Calf, 0	ND	ND	ND
	Adult, 4	1/1	0/2	0/4
2013 Dec 30	Calf, 8	7/8	0/1	0/6
	Adult, 3	1/3‡	0	1/3‡
2014 Feb 14	Calf, 7	0/7	ND	0/7
	Adult, 2	0/2	ND	0/2

- *Nasal > faecal*
- *Duration of shedding < 1 month*

*Hemida et al EID 2014*

## Contacts:

Herdsman n=4

Other staff in contact with herd n=8

Staff in camel hospital n=30


General population = n=146

**All sero-negative**

*Transmission to humans is inefficient*

*Hemida et al EID 2015*


# Multiple introduction of MERS-CoV from camel to human



# Asymptomatic MERS-CoV Infection in Humans Linked to Infected Dromedaries

## Camels

Rapid antigen test



(A) Positive (B) Negative

7/5/2015: Dromedary camels transported from Oman to UAE. Sampled at border.  
8/8 RT-PCR pos for MERS-CoV

14/5/2015: Dromedary camels still RT-PCR positive

25/5/2015: Dromedary camels RT-PCR negative


## Contacts 1 and 2

Contact 1: Driver of truck; asymptomatic  
10/5/2015: RTPCR +ve  
12/5/2015: RT-PCR +ve, Hospitalized  
13/5/2015: RT-PCR +ve  
14/5/2015: RT-PCR +ve  
18/5?2015: RT-PCR -ve

Contact 2: Cleaner in quarantine station, asymptomatic  
14/5/2015: RTPCR +ve  
18/5/2015: RT-PCR -ve, Hospitalized  
21/5/2015: RT-PCR -ve

32 other contacts of dromedaries  
All RT-PCR -ve

Viral RNA sequence from dromedaries were identical with each other. Human sequences were also identical but only short fragments were available.





هيئة الصحة  
HEALTH AUTHORITY



# Epidemiology of MERS-CoV: What we know

Sustained transmission in animals, not sustained in humans



# Countrywide cross-sectional sero-epidemiological survey for MERS-CoV antibodies in Saudi Arabia

Population sampled	Sero-positives (NT test)		
	N (%)	95% CI	P value
General population (>15 years of age) (n=10,009)	15 (0.2%)	(0.1-0.2%)	Reference
Camel shepherds (n=87)	2 (2.3%)	(0.3-7.4%)	0.0004
Slaughterhouse workers (n=140)	5 (3.6%)	(1.3-7.7%)	0.0001


*Muller et al Lancet Infect Dis 2015*

- **Estimated 44,951 (95% CI: 26,971-71,922) people > 15 years old have been infected with MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia over their lifetimes**
  - **Total Saudi population is 29.8 million**
- **Median age of sero-positives younger than confirmed MERS cases** (43.4 yrs vs. 53.8 yrs (p=0.008))
- **Sero-prevalence of Men > Women** (Men 0.25% > Women 0.05%) (p=0.28)
- Higher in central vs costal provinces

Subclinical infected human cases as the viral source in communities ?

# MERS-CoV genetic diversity:

## Does camel MERS-CoV from Africa have capacity to infect humans?




Spike protein found in camel from Egypt: no amino acid differences in receptor binding region

Top 10 countries for camel populations (FAO, 2012)

Country	species	Number	Unit
* Somalia	Camels	7000000	Heads
Sudan	Camels	4751000	Heads
Kenya	Camels	3065400	Heads
Niger	Camels	1676567	Heads
Chad	Camels	1450000	Heads
Mauritania	Camels	1425000	Heads
Pakistan	Camels	1000000	Heads
Mali	Camels	959783	Heads
* Ethiopia	Camels	915518	Heads
India	Camels	438000	Heads

**Non A/B Clade**  
African camels



Chu et al., EID 2014  
Hemida et al., EID 2014  
Chu et al., Eurosurveillance 2015


# Ex vivo cultures - Human respiratory tract

ALI culture = Air liquid interface culture; F12K medium

Nasopharyngeal




Bronchi




Lung




ALI culture – sponge






ALI culture – Rotor / sponge



Lung slice culture



# Replication competence of human and dromedary MERS-CoV in human bronchus and lung



Genetically and phenotypically, Saudi and Egyptian camel MERS-CoV appears able to infect the human respiratory tract

Why no zoonotic MERS in Africa?



Dromedary camels



Camel milk:  
taken fresh without boiling



Camel racing



Camel slaughterhouse

# Genetically diverse MERS-CoV are antigenically homogenous

Patient ID	Day of illness	Reciprocal PRNT <sub>90</sub> antibody titer to MERS-CoV		
		EMC (clade A)	Camel Al-Hasa KFU-HKU13 (clade B)	Camel Egypt NRCE-HKU 270 (clade non A/B )
<b>B</b>	12	320	160	160
<b>B</b>	39	320	320	640
<b>G</b>	17	40	40	80
<b>G</b>	35	160	80	160

Collaboration with Seoul National University College of Medicine  
 Park SW, Perera RAPM, -- Peiris M, Oh MD – Eurosurveillance – on line


Also demonstrated with naturally infected camel sera

*Hemida MG, et al Emerg Infect Dis. 2014 Jul;20(7):1231-4.*


# Can we treat MERS with camel immune serum?

## Weight loss of IFNAR-/- hDPP4 transfected mice challenged with MERS-CoV followed by passive therapy with MERS-CoV immune serum

- Ad5-hDPP4 transfection of IFNAR-/- mice 5 days before challenge
- Challenge (i.n.) with  $10^5$  MERS CoV
- Treat with 200ul camel serum (i.p.) neut Ab tier 1:1280 1 day later



N=5 mice per group



Immune sera could be also used for prophylactic purposes in experimental conditions







## An orthopoxvirus-based vaccine reduces virus excretion after MERS-CoV infection in dromedary camels

Bart L. Haagmans<sup>1,\*</sup>, Judith M. A. van den Brand<sup>1</sup>, V. Stalin Raj<sup>1</sup>, Asisa Volz<sup>2</sup>, Peter Wohlsein<sup>3</sup>, Saskia L. Smits<sup>1</sup>, Debby Schipper<sup>1</sup>, Theo M. Bestebroer<sup>1</sup>, Nisreen Okba<sup>1</sup>, Robert Fux<sup>2</sup>, Albert Bensaïd<sup>4</sup>, David Solanes Foz<sup>4</sup>, Thijs Kuiken<sup>1</sup>, Wolfgang Baumgärtner<sup>3</sup>, Joaquim Segalés<sup>5,6</sup>, Gerd Sutter<sup>2,\*</sup>, Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus<sup>1,7,8,\*</sup>

### Hurdles:

- Cannot induce sterilizing immunity
- Protective duration?



# Detection of infection MERS-CoV in adult camel with high neutralizing antibody

- NT antibodies might not confer a complete protection against MERS-CoV?
- Possibility of re-infections?

A lot of unknown about MERS-CoV in camels.

Farm, sampling date	Camel no.	Calf/Adult†	Age	RT-PCR result			Copy/mL‡	Antibody titers§	
				Nasal sample	Oral sample	Fecal sample			
Farm A	2013 Nov 30	1	Adult	13 y	Pos¶	Neg	Neg	$2.61 \times 10^7$	>5,120
	2	Adult	12 y	–	–	Neg	–	–	>5,120
	3	Adult	10 y	–	Neg	Neg	–	–	>5,120
	4	Adult	14 y	–	–	Neg	–	–	>5,120
	2013 Dec 4	5	Adult	8 y	–	Neg	Neg	–	640
	6	Adult	9 y	–	Neg	Neg	–	2,560	–
	7	Adult	10 y	–	Neg	–	–	–	>5,120
	7Calf	Calf	1–2 y	–	Neg	Neg	–	–	1,280
	7Dam	Adult	9.5 y	–	Neg	–	–	–	2,560
	8	Adult	7 y	–	Neg	Neg	–	–	1,280
	9	Adult	6 y	–	Neg	Neg	–	–	1,280
	10	Adult	8 y	–	Neg	Neg	–	–	640
	11Calf	Calf	1–2 y	–	Neg	Neg	–	–	–
	11Dam	Adult	–	–	Neg	Neg	–	–	–
	12	Adult	12 y	–	Neg	Neg	–	–	320
	2013 Dec 30	13	Calf	1 y	Pos¶	–	–	$1.30 \times 10^8$	<20
	14	Calf	1 y	Pos¶	–	Neg	–	$1.78 \times 10^8$	<20
	15	Calf	1 y	Pos	–	Neg	–	$6.07 \times 10^6$	20
	16	Calf	1 y	Pos	–	Neg	–	$3.78 \times 10^7$	>5,120
	17	Calf	40 d	Pos	–	Neg	–	$4.86 \times 10^4$	80
	18	Calf	40 d	Neg	Neg	–	–	–	–
19Calf	Calf	1 y	Pos	–	Neg	–	$2.41 \times 10^7$	–	
19Dam	Adult	–	Neg	–	Pos¶*	–	$9.27 \times 10^7$	–	
20	Adult	8 y	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	>5,120	
21	Adult	7 y	Pos	–	Neg	–	$3.31 \times 10^7$	320	
22	Calf	2 wk	Pos	–	Neg	–	$3.38 \times 10^7$	1,280	
2014 Feb 14	26	Calf	9 mo	Neg	–	Neg	–	>5,120	
13	Calf	1 y	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	640	
27	Calf	10 mo	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	40	
15	Calf	1 y	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	160	
17	Calf	3 mo	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	1,280	
11Dam	Adult	12 y	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	1,280	
19Calf	Calf	1 y	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	320	
28Calf	Calf	3 mo	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	20	
28Dam	Adult	10 y	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	1,280	
Farm B, 2014 Feb 11	23Calf	Calf	2.5 mo	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	
23Dam	Adult	7 y	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	>5,120	
24Calf	Calf	2 mo	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	–	
24Dam	Adult	6 y	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	1,280	
25Calf	Calf	2 mo	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	–	
25Dam	Adult	6 y	Neg	–	Neg	–	–	640	

\*RT-PCR, reverse transcription PCR; MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus; Pos, positive; Neg, negative; –, specimen not collected or age information not available.

†Calf defined as dromedary camel <2 y of age; adult defined as dromedary camel ≥2 y of age.

‡Data deduced from the upstream of E assay.

§Pseudotype neutralization antibody titers.

¶Full genome sequenced.

#Virus isolated.

# Summary

- Camels are a source of human infection but transmission (leading to disease or seroconversion) is inefficient and routes / modes of transmission to humans are poorly understood.
  - *Asymptomatic humans as a source of transmission?*
  - *Unusual route of exposure?*
  - *Host heterogeneity ?*
- MERS-CoV is genetically diverse but antigenically homogenous
- There are well validated methods for MERS detection
  - MERS-spike pseudoparticle neutralization test is a reliable and specific method for sero-epidemiology / confirmation that does not require BSL-3 containment.
- Promising experimental vaccines have been developed, but their potential use in the field are need to be evaluated

# MERS: What we do **NOT** know

- Old disease or new:
  - Virus was circulating in dromedary camels for >30 years. Why no disease till 2012?
- Why not in Africa?
  - Virus is endemic in dromedary camels in Africa. Why no human cases reported?
- Why is zoonotic MERS apparently so rare / stochastic but efficient transmission within health care facilities?
  - Virus is common in dromedary camels, e.g. in calves and in abattoirs.
  - Why are the highly exposed groups not prominent in patients with MERS?
  - Parallels with avian flu H5N1
- Can it / what will lead to, increased transmission within the community? → SARS experience!!
- Route of transmission from camels to humans?
- Other animal hosts (reservoir, intermediate host)?

# Technology transfer and collaborations

WHO site visit:  
South Korea

WHO/FAO site visit:  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

FAO site visit:  
United Arab Emirates

WHO/FAO/Other trainings:  
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
United Arab Emirates  
Overseas visitors

Collaborators from :  
Australia  
Egypt  
KSA  
France  
Mongolia  
South Korea  
UAE  
Others



Veterinary lab



Slaughterhouse



Hospital

FAO training course in HK



Household visit



Camel farm



Racing court



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